syndrome . . . from the human population by germ-line alterations, is there any convincing moral reason why this should not be done?" (quoted on 169). Most of her readers will come to this book already believing that there is something ethically repugnant about our contemporary culture of fetal perfectionism. But this should not hide the fact that she offers little argument for why we should feel this repugnance. Rothschild's book addresses issues that are important for feminist philosophers to think about, and for this she deserves our gratitude. However, we must judge such a book on the strength of its scholarship and its argumentation, and not just on the basis of our sympathy with its thesis and our resonance with its moral sensibilities.
Notes
See page 61 and elsewhere. I give future page references to this work in paren-1. theses in the text.
For already-classic original discussions of each of these three topics, see, for 2. example, Duden 1993; Parens and Asch 2000; and Rothman 1992, respectively. Of course, these attitudes are trivially gendered, in the sense that only men can 3. donate sperm and only women can be surrogate mothers-but presumably Rothschild was trying to make a stronger point than this. readers for the very reasons Zerilli needs to make it. There are longstanding problems in the dominant Western tradition with thinking about action as well as acting for freedom. Feminists-who perforce work within as well as against dominant meaning systems-have often been tangled in the very problems we also challenge.
Having realized just how profound and widespread some basic conceptual muddles in political theorizing are, Zerilli distances herself from what she calls nostalgia for second-wave feminist politics, but also questions its critics. Of Nancy Cott and Joan Scott, Zerilli writes, for example, that they both "try to reframe modern feminism as constituted by paradox, by the need both to accept and refuse sexual difference," but thereby stop short of the deeper question of "whether the tenacity of the impossible choice framework of equality or difference that they would expose can be properly understood, let alone overcome, without attending to the larger frame in which feminist struggles for political rights have been posed: the frame of the social question and its means-ends conception of politics" (5).
Zerilli's examination of the action-centered thinking of the Milan Women's Bookstore Collective is intended to help break theorists out of their stuck places-such as that we just encountered, reducing politics to a technical matter of fixing social problems. Most acute and valuable is that she does so in the company of philosophers. In particular, Arendt and Wittgenstein, generally apologized for as non-if not antifeminist, and Wittig, sometimes written out of third-wave feminism for her purported "humanism," turn out, in Zerilli's wonderfully intelligent and nuanced reading of them, to offer feminists ways out of our various impasses. Centrally, they help Zerilli make her complex, effective case for action and the freedom it realizes in the world without recourse to any prior or final justifications beyond the "abyss of freedom" itself.
In good Wittgensteinian style, and with his crucial assistance, Zerilli succeeds in offering us a way out of the epistemological fly bottle in which those who believe a political movement must have a singular subject whose lot needs to be improved (for example woman) remain fruitlessly pitted against those who see the nonsense and contradictions in positing essentialized identities. Among the latter, Zerilli questions Judith Butler. Butler, Zerilli says, does distance herself from epistemological "problems of grounding knowledge claims" to focus on "relations of power and their naturalization," but nevertheless fails to break free of a "paradoxical entrapment in the very skeptical problematic" she set out to challenge (47).
Zerilli avoids that entrapment by recalling that among Wittgenstein's liberating "genuine insights" is the realization that we can and should "call into question the whole problematic of justification in which philosophical accounts of following a rule have been thought" (45). Having thus remembered the need to ask why anyone feels the need for a unified concept, principle, or rule in the first place, Zerilli opens space to rethink political, moral, and aesthetic theorizing.
The obvious issue of judgment is significant throughout Zerilli's book. She does a superb job of showing how Arendt's understanding of judgment-in close conversation with Kant's reflective or indeterminate judgment as developed in his third Critique-allows us to renounce an epistemic quest for grounds of justification without thereby necessarily falling into skepticism. We are not, after all, paralyzed, unable to make choices or take stands or evaluate action if we cannot make deductive judgments, or in some way find a way around following a rule. In political and aesthetic judgments, the issue, as Kant, Arendt, and Cavell (whom Zerilli also usefully brings in here) tell us, is not the question of whether we can or cannot have knowledge about the real world we experience, but whether we do or do not, and how we do or do not, acknowledge something or someone "as part of our common world and in this way accord value" (178). As Zerilli puts it, this switch from the Kantian first Critique issue of "theoretical judgment" to the third Critique issue of "aesthetic judgment" is both apropos and helpful to feminism because "at issue in social relationships and bodies that do not conform to the concepts of sexual dimorphism, for example, is not simply the cognitive judgment of their existence-as if we did not know of it-but the reflective judgment of how they, in their singularity, will count for us" (178). Furthermore, "When we apply interpretation to ordinary cases of rule-following (as Butler and Derrida do), we misunderstand what it means to follow a rule. To know how to do something (read a signpost, play chess, calculate, or sing a tune) involves an immediate understanding or grasping exhibited through action, not an interpretation. Wouldn't the same point hold for 'doing' or 'performing' gender?" (54).
Not surprisingly, given her turn back to action and determination to think better about it, Zerilli also takes Arendt's efforts to "think what we are doing," to comprehend and revalue the vita activa, the life of action, as the Ariadne's thread to follow back out of the Minotaur's lair into which quests for epistemological justifications of action by (ideally universal) rules or grounds have led feminists (and hardly feminists alone). With Wittgenstein and Arendt, in particular, Zerilli thus invites us out of the trap of trying to justify our freedom as if this primary as well as superlative political achievement, which can only be "figured in the form of an example and as part of a practice," could be "proved like a truth or possessed like a substance" (182).
In Zerilli's fresh reading, Monique Wittig's Les Guerillers also, and importantly, contributes to letting us out of the fly bottle of epistemic justification. Zerilli's reading brings Wittig into conversation with Hannah Arendt, in particular in their agreement that freedom can only be "a political phenomenon-a property of what Arendt called the 'I-can,' not the I-will'-that is inconceivable outside the realm of speech and action" (70). "The real promise of Wittig's work," for Zerilli (who disagrees with Butler's dismissal of Wittig as "a humanist" because it misreads Wittig as concerned with "the question of subjectivity" rather than "the problem of freedom"), is "not to put sex into doubt but to dramatize the space and practice of freedom, the power of beginning, and new modes of human association" (71). That is, the "abyssal structure" of freedom as Arendt also understood it-in Zerilli's words, "not given in advance in the form of potentiality . . . not made necessary by something in the relations of oppression, and . . . not legitimated by anything outside itself" (71) 
Christina M. Bellon
In Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, Carol Gould continues the project she began in Rethinking Democracy (1988) to forge a coherent theory of global democracy from the best of contemporary justice theorizing, feminist philosophy and practice, and democratic theorizing and practice. Along the way, she eloquently and thoroughly maps the rough relationship between democratic theory and democratic practice, and its effect on addressing the challenges to both that globalization presents. Gould's recent book is richly complex and she intricately weaves theory together with practice, traditional concepts with critical re-visions, which will reward the reader with a deeper and more subtle appreciation of the utility of democratic and human rights theories and of their limitations. It is well worth the read.
Gould makes at least three significant contributions to the political philosophic literature on democracy, human rights, and global justice in Globalizing Democracy. First, she elaborates and applies the social ontology she began in Marx 's Social Ontology (1978) and applied in Rethinking Democracy (1988) . Here, Gould refines the account by demonstrating its application to human rights theory. It is possible, she contends, to conceive of human rights as foundational to an adequate conception of international justice and to a conception of democracy adequate to meet the challenges presented by globalization, without resorting to essentialism or succumbing to the worryingly relativistic social constructivism found in much postmodern theorizing on the subject. Her claim that we ought to understand democracy as framed by an ontologically
